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INTRODUCTION

The high seas experienced many catastrophic events in the past year.
Starting in March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged nations across the
globe while leaving cruise ships and their stranded employees, who were
forbidden to access ports, abandoned at sea for months.1 On August 4, 2020,
a massive explosion rocked Beirut, Lebanon, leaving hundreds dead and
thousands injured, and causing approximately $15 billion of damage.2 Two
days after the explosion, Mauritius declared a national emergency over a cargo
ship that initially ran aground in late July that leaked over one thousand tons
of fuel oil into the reefs of Mauritius, one of the world s most precious and
protected areas of biodiversity.3
These apparently random tragedies piled upon an already calamitous
year are more closely related than they initially seem. A common thread unites
these events, a global governance failure that allows actors to exploit and
abuse the high seas with devastating consequences not only to the
environment, but to the lives, property, and basic human rights of uncountable
individuals. The failure is a practice commonl referred to as flags of
convenience, a term relating to the registration and nationalit of ships that
allows some shipowners to avoid adhering to international standards for ship
operations.4
The ocean, like space, is an international common resource.5 As
humanit globali es, our oceans are a classic tale of the traged of the
commons, whereby collective resources are more easily exploited than

1

See David Millar, Flags of Convenience and the Cruise Ship Debacle, STRATEGIST (Apr.
17, 2020), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/flags-of-convenience-and-the-coronaviruscruise-ship-debacle/(discussing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, flags of
convenience, and the cruise industry).
2 See Ian Urbina, The Disturbing Story Behind the Beirut Port Explosion, NATIONAL (Sept.
2, 2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/world/lebanon-explosion-environmentshipping/ (reviewing the problem of abandonment of ships and flags of convenience in
the context of the Beirut port explosion); Sarah Al-Arshani, The $15 Billion Hit from the
Devastating Beirut Explosion will be a Gut-Punch to Lebanon s Hobbled Econom ,
INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2020, 11:49 PM), https://www.insider.com/beirut-explosion-could-costlebanons-struggling-economy-15-billion-2020-8 (estimating the damage from the Beirut
explosion to cost Lebanon around $15 billion).
3 See Navin Singh Khadka, Why the Mauritius Oil Spill is so Serious, BBC NEWS (Aug. 13,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53754751 (discussing the impact of the
Mauritius oil spill and the broader impact on biodiversity).
4
See
Flags
of
Convenience,
INT L
TRANSP.
WORKER S
FED N,
https://www.itfglobal.org/en/sector/seafarers/flags-of-convenience (last visited Feb. 11,
2022) (defining flags of convenience and the affect this practice has on the industr ).
5 Elizabeth Mrema, Introduction: Protecting the Global Commons, 18 GEO. J. INT L. AFR.
3, 3 (2017).
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conserved, ignored than managed, and depleted than replenished. 6The ocean
supplies more than half of the o gen we breath and provides food and
livelihoods for billions of people worldwide. . 7 But now, [c]enturies of
overuse and neglect threaten to leave us with a vast blue wasteland. 8 Our
oceans and those who depend on them for food, transportation, or employment
face unprecedented threat.9 Unsustainable fishing, inadequate protection of
marine areas, the shipping industry, pollution from oil and gas, climate
change, and other problems threaten to destroy this valuable resource.10
Beyond the environmental consequences, these problems pose an enormous
threat to the safety and security of people around the world, illustrated by both
the Beirut explosion and the COVID-19 cruise ship debacle.11
Man countries assisted in graduall depleting the ocean s health and
resources, but no individual country has the capacity to singlehandedly
remedy the damage.12 International cooperation is the sole solution to this
collective action problem, but current international agreements and regulatory
schemes fall short.13 An example is the failure of the international community
to remedy the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, an accidental aquatic landfill
floating in the Pacific Ocean that contains immeasurable quantities of plastic
waste from around the world.14
The UN previously implemented international agreements to protect
and conserve the world s deteriorating oceans.15 However, these international
agreements ield slow results because the often either lack or have
inadequate [measures for] monitoring or enforcement. 16
Flags of convenience are a prime e ample of the lowest common
denominator taking advantage of regulatory gaps in international agreements
to exploit the high seas.17 Under international law, vessels must sail under the
6

Id.
The Ocean, WWF, https://explore.panda.org/oceans (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See Millar, supra note 1 (discussing the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on halting
the cruise industry); Urbina, supra note 2 (examining the catastrophic effects of the August
2020 Beirut explosion).
12 Mrema, supra note 5, at 3.
13 Id. at 3-4.
14
Great
Pacific
Garbage
Patch,
NAT L.
GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/great-pacific-garbage-patch/
(last
visited Feb. 12, 2022).
15
See Mrema, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing different UN agreements including the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Antarctic Treaty Systems, and the UN
Environment s Regional Seas Conventions and Protocols, but fundamental gaps and
inconsistencies remain that require immediate attention. ).
16 Id.
17 Id.
7
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flag of a particular nation, and that nation inspects the vessels and their
seaworthiness, ensures safety and pollution prevention, and certifies the
crews.18 Flag nations are primarily responsible for enforcing international
standards for the ship and crew.19 However, some states fall short on the
compliance and enforcement aspects of regulation, often intentionally, to
attract shipowners looking to reduce operating costs and increase profit
margins, as countries earn revenue from their fleet.20 Non-complying states
employ open registry systems that allow ship owners in other countries to
register their ships in a foreign state.21 A ship registered on the open registry
would sail under a flag of convenience, a term describing a ship sailing
under a flag state with lax enforcement of international regulations, lower
taxes, and easy, low-cost vessel registration procedures.22
Flags of convenience epitomize the common resource problem of the
ocean, and though the practice is widely criticized, it remains a common
method by which shipowners avoid taxes, regulations, and liability.23 Flags of
convenience undercut the myriad of aspirational and environmentally
responsible regulations set forth by international governing bodies.24
The UN, in drafting a new treaty designed to protect and conserve
marine biodiversit of areas be ond national jurisdiction, signals to the
world that the international community recognizes the need to finally address
the common resource problem of the high seas.25 The treaty, abbreviated as
the BBNJ Treat , will cover a large portion of the ocean ( 50 percent of the
planet s surface and all the water below ) and intends to encourage the
conservation and sustainable use of marine resources. 26
To effectively promote such conservation and sustainability, the
treaty must address flags of convenience. The international community must
18Flags

of Convenience, NGO SHIPBREAKING PLATFORM (last visited Feb. 12, 2022),
https://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/issues-of-interest/focs/.
19 Id.
20 Id.; Nivedita M. Hosanee, A Critical Analysis of Flag State Duties as Laid Down Under
Article 94 Of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea, U.N. DIV. FOR
OCEAN
AFFAIRS
AND
LAWS
OF
THE
SEA
71
(2009),
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_pa
pers/hosanee_0910_mauritious.pdf.
21 Judith Swan, Fishing Vessels Operating Under Open Registers and the Exercise of Flag
State Responsibilities Information and Options, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.
(2002), https://www.fao.org/3/y3824e/y3824e00.htm#Contents.
22 Flags of Convenience, supra note 18.
23 Id.
24
Id.
25 Stewart M. Patrick, Why the U.N. Pact on the High Seas Biodiversity is too Important to
Fail,
WORLD
POL.
REV.
(July
8,
2020),
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28011/why-the-u-n-pact-on-high-seasbiodiversity-is-too-important-to-fail.
26 Id.
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hold accountable countries that fail to meet international standards.
Otherwise, countries will continue the same practices to achieve a competitive
edge in e ploiting the ocean s resources, at the ever-increasing expense of
everyone else.
This Note will analyze the probability that the BBNJ Treaty will
eliminate or regulate flags of convenience, the effects the agreement might
have on flags of convenience, and thus whether the treaty will successfully
achieve its goals. Without directly mentioning and addressing open registries
and enforcement of regulations, it appears unlikely that the treaty will fully
achieve its intended results of environmental protection and conservation. Part
II of this Note will describe accidents at sea that occurred because of flags of
convenience, discuss past treaty iterations, and propose the incorporation of a
more extensive and robust regulatory scheme for enforcement and
accountability in the language of the treaty. Part III of this Note will
recommend that the drafters of the treaty directly include language regarding
open registr states and call for increased oversight of those countries fleets
by the flag state.
II.

BACKGROUND

As markets continue to globalize, the use of international shipping
grows and shifts.27 As ships become larger and more numerous, the need for
effective regulation and oversight becomes even more pressing. More ships
result in more trafficked shipping routes and a greater potential for accidents.
With more ships than ever sailing around the world, safety and environmental
responsibility matters more than ever, drawing greater attention to countries
with open ship registries.28
Open registries allow vessels to register under a countr s flag despite
a lack of real connections between the ship and the country.29 Vessels choose
to operate under flags of convenience primarily for economic and regulatory
reasons flags of convenience states offer lower taxes, fewer regulations,
lower registration fees, and cheap labor.30 With almost seventy-three percent
of the world s vessels registered in a countr different than that of its
27

See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 50 Years of Review of Maritime
Transport, 1968-2018, UNCTAD/DTL/2018/1, at 8 (2018) (stating that [t]he trend
towards globalization of production and markets has posed enormous challenges and
influenced production and transportation patterns and requirements, which raised new
challenges for national governments, particularly of developing countries, in the
management of their economic and social development. ).
28 See Flags of Convenience, supra note 4 (describing flags of convenience and open
registries as a problematic rush to the bottom scenario).
29 Id.
30 Id.
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ownership,31 many ships likely fail to meet the minimum ship regulation
standards implemented by the UN.32 This raises significant concerns in terms
of safety, pollution, and human rights, as vessels may be inherently unsafe or
owners choose to cut corners to maximize profit.33 Additionally, flags of
convenience allow companies to avoid liability for their unscrupulous
practices by increasing owner anonymity, and avoid oversight by registering
in states without the resources or incentive to activel monitor their fleet s
operations.34 Ultimately, flags of convenience are a primary culprit behind
many maritime incidents and environmental disasters, and must either be fully
eliminated or greatly reformed to protect the oceans and establish a safe, wellregulated shipping industry.
A. Accidents at Sea
Flags of convenience lie at the heart of many accidents at sea.35 These
accidents manifest in both expected and surprising ways, as illustrated by the
following oil-related incidents. In 1978, a 228,513-ton supertanker named the
Amoco Cadiz, operated by a subsidiary of the American-owned Standard Oil
Company and sailed under the Liberian flag, ran aground off the coast of
France, leaked 220,000 tons of crude oil and raised questions about the lack
of effective regulation of tankers sailing under flags of convenience. 36 The
Amoco Cadiz spill surpassed the Torrey Canyon spill, which happened eleven
years prior, as the largest oil spill in history.37 The Amoco Cadiz example is
a direct consequence of a ship sailing under a flag of convenience, but the

31

Flags of Convenience, supra note 18.
See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Convention on
Conditions for Registration of Ships, U.N. Doc. TD/RS/CONF./23, adopted by the United
Nations Conference on Conditions for the Registration of Ships, art. 10-11, Feb. 7, 1986,
12 U.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter UNCTAD].
33
See Jessica Battle, Justice for the Ocean, WWF (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://medium.com/@WWF/justice-for-the-ocean-ce5c915501df (discussing the failure
of states to govern ship crews and its devastating effects).
34 Id. (examining flags of convenience in light of recent ecological disasters as a major
threat to the future wellbeing of the oceans and the Earth; [v]arious international rules and
regulations for the operations of ships and fishing already exist, but the shirking of flag
state responsibility and the heavy lift to make those responsible pay for damage stand in
the way and, thus, the ocean and dependent coastal states lose out. ).
35
See Millar, supra note 1 (discussing how the COVID-19 pandemic stalled the cruise
industry); Urbina, supra note 2 (discussing the August 2020 Beirut explosion).
36 John Kifner, Wreck of the Amoco Cadiz Revives Issue of Safety in Transporting Oil, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/1978/03/23/archives/wreck-of-theamoco-cadiz-revives-issue-of-safety-in-transporting.html.
37 Id.
32
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infamous BP Oil Spill reveals the true scope of the problem.38 In 2010, the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, killing eleven workers and releasing over
130 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.39 Oil rigs technically
fall under the vessel categor and are thus required to register with a state
and fly its flag.40 Deepwater Horizon was registered under the Marshall
Islands, a flag of convenience state with a gross domestic product 700 times
less than BP s market capitali ation. 41
Beyond oil spills, the aforementioned cruise ship example and the
Beirut explosion highlight the scope of the types of accident that result from
flags of convenience.42 Early into the COVID-19 pandemic, cruise ships
garnered international attention as outbreaks caused countries to block the
ships from entering port, stranding crews at sea for long periods of time with
insufficient living conditions.43 Cruise lines often register under flags of
convenience for reasons stated above (cheap labor, fewer regulations and
ta es, etc.), [b]ut the pandemic has shown that cruise shipping is essentiall
an unregulated industr that has thrived in an environment lacking rules. 44
The second recent international incident resulting from flags of
convenience is the Beirut explosion. It killed at least 190 people, injured over
6,500, and destroyed buildings across the city.45 The story began in 2013,
when a barel seaworth ship, owned by a Russian man living in Cyprus
and flagged under the Marshall Islands, was abandoned with a deadly cargo
38

Deepwater Horizon- BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, ENV T PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2022).
39 Joan Meiners, Ten Years Later, BP Oil Spill Continues to Harm Wildlife Especially
Dolphins,
NAT L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Apr.
17,
2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2020/04/how-is-wildlife-doing-now--tenyears-after-the-deepwater-horizon/#close.
40 See Brian Baker, Flags of Convenience and the Gulf Oil Spill: Problems and Proposed
Solutions, 34 HOUS. J. INT L L. 687, 690 (2012) (explaining how the Marshall Islands
possessed responsibility for overseeing and ensuring regulatory compliance of Deepwater
Horizon).
41 Andrew Clark, BP Oil Rig Registration Raised in Congress Over Safety Concerns,
GUARDIAN (May 30, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/may/30/oilspill-deepwater-horizon-marshall-islands.
42 See Millar, supra note 1 (Discussing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cruise
industry); Urbina, supra note 2 (Examining underlying issues surrounding the August 2020
Beirut explosion).
43 See Millar, supra note 1 ( [a]s we ve seen during the Covid-19 crisis, if a port won t
allow the crew ashore, and the owners won t pa for them to return home, the ship and
crew are stranded at sea like some 21st century Flying Dutchman. ).
44 Id.
45 See Urbina, supra note 2 (highlighting that
[a]bandonment of ships, flags of
convenience, and la law enforcement are common at sea, often with tragic
consequences. ).

2022]

ACCIDENTS ON THE HIGH SEAS

711

of ammonium nitrate outside the Port of Beirut after the abandonment,
Lebanese authorities had no choice but to deal with the cargo themselves. 46
They placed the ammonium nitrate in a hangar, where it stayed until stray
fireworks ignited the blast.47 Without ending the practice of flags of
convenience, no treaty will sufficiently prevent these largescale, devastating
accidents.
B. Registration of Ships and Flags of Convenience
Flags of convenience allow small shipowners and companies to
operate when they otherwise could not afford to meet the monetary costs of
regulatory compliance, but the harm of the practice far outweighs the benefits.
Each of the vessels from the above examples operated under the flag of a state
labeled b the International Transport Worker s Federation (ITF) as a flag of
convenience country.48 The ITF defines a flag of convenience ship as one
that flies the flag of a country other than the countr of ownership. 49
Ships usually possess nationality, meaning that they must register to
a specific state and be subject to that nation s laws and regulations. 50 When
ships are permitted to register with countries other than that of the owner of
the vessel, a greater amount of ships sail under flags with less regulations and
oversight.51 States are permitted to determine the requirements for registration
of ships, and other states must recogni e those vessels nationalit .52 Often,
states with open registries are smaller countries with smaller economies. 53
These states oversee the fleet of ships registered under its name, but those
countries often do not have the resources to fulfill that obligation fully,
allowing shipowners to cut corners and cause accidents.54 Additionally, flags

46

Id.
Id.
48 See Flags of Convenience, supra note 4 (the ITF s Fair Practice Committee designates
thirty-five countries as flag of convenience states).
49 Id.
50 See H. Edwin Anderson, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics,
Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 141 (1997) (stating that [t]he concept
of vessel nationality has evolved concurrently with the political sovereignty of nationstates. In the status quo, all vessels must have nationalit . ).
51 L. F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience - Does the
Present Law Pose Special Liability Issues?, 3 PACE Y.B. INT L L. 63, 63(1991).
52 Id. at 66.
53
See Anthony Van Fossen, Flags of Convenience and Global Capitalism, 6 INT L
CRITICAL
THOUGHT
359,
360
(2016),
https://researchrepository.griffith.edu.au/bitstream/handle/10072/99637/FossenPUB1582.pdf?sequence=
1 (finding that many major flags of convenience states are small islands in the Caribbean).
54 Flag States Responsibilities and Seafarer s Rights, SEAFARERS' RTS. INT L (Sept. 29,
2014), https://seafarersrights.org/flag-state-responsibilities-and-seafarersrights/.
47
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of convenience make determining liability more difficult because shipowners
can layer the true ownership of vessels through corporate identities and
multiple jurisdictions.55
C. Current Treaty Iterations
The international body of law regarding the registration and
nationality of ships developed over the course of centuries, but the UN
codified these rules in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 56 Specifically,
Article Five of the Convention describes the United Nation s framework for
ship registration and recognition, designating the power to fi the conditions
for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its
territor , and for the right to fl its flag to individual states. 57 The Convention
states that [s]hips have the nationalit of the State whose flag the are entitled
to fly. There must e ist a genuine link between the State and the ship, and
that the State must effectivel e ercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships fl ing its flag. 58 The
genuine link concept requires a ship and a flag state to share some
connection.59
Article 94, sections one through five of the United Nations
Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulate the duties and
responsibilities of flag states.60 In summary, states are required under
UNCLOS to maintain a register containing names and details about its ships,
assume jurisdiction under its internal law in matters concerning the ship or
its crew, and take necessary measures for ensuring safety at sea. 61 These
necessary measures pertain to the construction and seaworthiness of the ships,
the labor conditions and the crews, and the use and maintenance of
communication mechanisms. 62 States are required to conform to generall
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any
steps which ma be necessar to secure their observance. 63
These treaty provisions promote safety and responsibility of vessels
and flag states, and the genuine link concept in article 94 of UNCLOS should

55

See Battle, supra note 33 (discussing the failure of states to police their ships and crews).
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S.11.
57 Id. at art. 5.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60
United Nations Convention on the Laws on the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
56
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theoretically address flags of convenience by forcing vessels to be connected
to the flag under which they register. However, the genuine link term is so
ambiguous that this requirement lacks any teeth in its practical application.
Overall, international law fails to adequately address flags of
convenience. The genuine link requirement, though intended to ensure
connections between the vessel and the flag state, falls short because (1) the
treaty requires the genuine link while also granting flag states wide discretion
in their policies and (2) the term genuine link was never adequatel defined
in international law.64 In allowing states such broad discretion and regulatory
power, the international community gives individual states a great deal of
autonomy in the management of their fleets.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), an organ of the
U.N., is the global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and
environmental performance of international shipping and [i]ts main role is
to create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and
effective, universall adopted and universall implemented. 65 However, the
mere existence of a regulatory framework and the aspirational statement that
the international community would universally adopt and implement such
framework does not reflect in practice, because flag states are economically
incentivized to minimize taxes, costs, and regulations.66
III.

SOLUTIONS

With the increase in global commerce and a greater concern
regarding climate change and conservation, the UN turned its attention to
protecting biodiversity and marine life by forming the Intergovernmental
Conference on an [i]nternational legall binding instrument under the United
64

See Eric Powell, Taming the Beast: How the International Legal Regime Creates and
Contains Flags of Convenience, 19 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT L & COMP. L. 266, 295-96
(2013),
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1174&context=annlsurv
e (discussing how [t]his approach epitomi es the tension between traditional maritime
principles and challenges of the new order: the international community has struggled to
define genuine link in light of the understanding that State sovereignt includes the right
to set registr terms. ).
65 See International Maritime Organization, Introduction to IMO, I NT L MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2022) ( In other
words, its role is to create a level playing-field so that ship operators cannot address their
financial issues by simply cutting corners and compromising on safety, security and
environmental performance. This approach also encourages innovation and efficienc . ).
66FOCs, INT L TRANS. WORKERS FED N, https://www.itfseafarers.org/en/focs (last visited
Feb. 24, 2022) ( In an increasingl fierce competitive shipping market, each new FOC is
forced to promote itself by offering the lowest possible fees and the minimum of
regulation. ).
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable
use of marine biological diversit of areas be ond national jurisdiction. 67
Known as the draft BBNJ Treat (short for biological diversit of marine
areas be ond national jurisdiction ), the te t encourages [e]nhancing
international cooperation and encouraging the adoption of complementary
measures within e isting frameworks, though it remains unclear whether this
international cooperation will create greater unity in IMO standards
compliance.68
A. Treaty Content and Applicable Language
However, as stated in the Ocean Yearbook s research article
comparing UNCLOS to the new BBNJ treat , [t]he UN negotiations for a
new agreement on BBNJ
provide an opportunit to create a platform for
international cooperation and more coherent action to redress these gaps and
weaknesses in an increasingl crowded, degraded, depleted ocean. 69 Perhaps
most promising is Article Six of the draft treaty:
Article 6
International cooperation
1. States Parties shall cooperate under this Agreement for the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, including
through strengthening and enhancing cooperation with and
among relevant legal instruments and frameworks and
relevant global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies
and members thereof in the achievement of the objective of
this Agreement.
2. States Parties shall promote international cooperation in
marine scientific research and in the development and
transfer of marine technology consistent with the
Convention in support of the objective of this Agreement.

67

G.A. Res. 72/249 (Dec. 24, 2017).
KLAUDIJA CREMERS ET AL., A PRELIMINARY A NALYSIS OF THE DRAFT HIGH SEAS
BIODIVERSITY TREATY, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND INT L RELATIONS 1 (Jan. 2020),
https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Etude/202
001-ST0120-high%20seas.pdf.
69 Kristina M. Gjerde et al., Building a Platform for the Future: The Relationship of the
Expected New Agreement for Marine Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 33 OCEAN Y.B. ONLINE 3, 15 (May 7, 2019).
68
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[3. States Parties shall cooperate to establish new global,
regional and sectoral bodies, where necessary.]70
Allowing for the possibility to create new bodies where necessary could
facilitate the implementation of a governing body that provides more
oversight into the enforcement of regulations. Additionally, if various states
are cooperating and communicating regarding marine biodiversity and
conservation, then states without sufficient regulatory regimes might fall
under greater degrees of scrutiny by the international community.
Incentivizing flag states to follow regulations based on this ecological and
cooperative framework could provide a countervailing incentive to flag of
convenience states, providing them with a new reason to tighten up their
systems. Beyond the states themselves, businesses and shipping vessels might
experience greater scrutiny and increased pressure to operate more
transparently and with better practices.
Delegates to the UN e pressed hope that that the new treat
slated to be completed in 2020 will be both robust in its scope and practical
in its application. 71 The effect of such a robust and practical treaty would
encourage sustainability, accountability, and transparency under which shady
vessels and flag of convenience states would find it more difficult to sail under
the radar of IMO regulators.72

70

Intergovernmental Conference on An International Legally Binding Instrument Under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable
Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, Revised Draft
Text of an Agreement Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond
National
Jurisdiction,
A/CONF.232/2020/3
(Nov.
18,
2019),
https://undocs.org/en/a/conf.232/2020/3 [hereinafter Draft BBNJ Agreement].
71 Press Release, Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity Third Session, Am
& PM Meetings, New Oceans Treaty Must Be Robust, Practical in Application, Delegates
Stress, Closing Third Round of Marine Biodiversity Negotiations, U.N. Press Release
SEA/2118 (Aug. 30, 2019).
72 KLAUDIJA CREMERS ET AL., STRENGTHENING, MONITORING, CONTROL AND
SURVEILLANCE IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION, STRONG HIGH SEAS PROJECT
35 (2020), https://www.prog-ocean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Cremers-Wrightand-Rochette-2019.-Strengthening-Monitoring-Control-and-Surveillance-in-AreasBeyond-National-Jurisdiction-1.pdf.
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B. The Genuine Link
The genuine link concept is well established in international law. 73
Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 91 of the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea both provide that there must exist a
genuine link between a State and a ship to which it has granted its
nationalit . 74 However, the concept has never been defined, either by treaty
or by tribunal,75 effectively removing any teeth this requirement might have
in policing flag states with open registries. Defining the genuine link in
international law could have far reaching implications in addressing flags of
convenience. Currently, each state sets its own requirements for the genuine
link standard, which allows open registry states to circumvent the genuine link
requirement altogether.76
The BBNJ Agreement contains no language defining or otherwise
elucidating the genuine link concept.77 If the drafters were to include an article
defining the requirements of a genuine link in the treaty, then fewer vessels
could register in flag of convenience, open registry states.78 However, the
international community will not include such language because it still
adheres to the principle that every nation has the right to create laws for ships
that fly its flag.79 The Treat s more general language on increasing
international cooperation and coordination of conservation efforts is more
palatable to a greater number of countries, while simultaneously turning the
spotlight to flag of convenience states. Those flag of convenience states are
often at the epicenter of the most flagrant violations by vessels in international
waters, like the Beirut explosion.80
C. Port State Control

73

Robin R. Churchill & Christopher Hedley, The Meaning of the Genuine Link
Requirement in Relation to the Nationality of Ships, INT L TRANS. WORKER S FED N 4, 68
(2000).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 68-70 ( An authoritative ruling as to what is meant b the genuine link requirement
in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions could only be provided by an international court, such
as the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or
b means of the conclusion of a supplementar agreement to the 1982 Convention. ).
76 Baker, supra note 40, at 705-706.
77
See generally Draft BBNJ Agreement, supra note 67 (failing to include the genuine link
concept, and any substantive definitions of genuine link in the draft text of the treaty).
78 Baker, supra note 40, at 706.
79 Baker, supra note 40, at 708.
80 Draft BBNJ Agreement, supra note 70, at art. 6. See also Urbina, supra note 2 (linking
the Beirut explosion and ship abandonment to flags of convenience).
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Port state control refers to port states inspecting and detaining vessels
that fail to meet minimum regulations of vessel seaworthiness, safety, and
human rights standards.81 Before the widespread use of flags of convenience,
the international community could depend on the reliability of port states in
enforcing the regulations set out by the IMO and controlling their ships. 82
However, [t]his approach became impracticable with the advent of flags of
convenience. 83 States recognized that it was necessary to ensure that ships
entering their ports were soundly made, so in 1982 fourteen European
countries gathered together to form the Paris Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), a regional system for port state control.84 Other regions of the world
used the Paris MOU as a guideline for establishing their own port regulations,
and under man IMO Conventions, ships are required to carr certificates
onboard to provide proof of inspection and to demonstrate compliance with
international standards. 85 Many states accept onboarding documents for
entry into their ports, but if a state performs an inspection on a vessel and finds
it fails to meet safety and labor standards, the state may dela the vessel s
departure or detain it.86 Additionally, that state may report the substandard
vessel to a database that records such information to increase transparency in
the industry.87
Allowing port states regulatory power over ships flagged by other
countries provides a last resort safeguard against blatant enforcement
violations by flag of convenience countries. However, port regulation falls
short because many vessels either slip through the cracks or experience
jurisdictional issues relating to their respective flag states.88 While port state

81

See Dr. Z. O. Özçayir, The Use of Port State Control in Maritime Industry and the
Application of the Paris MOU, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 201, 201-202 (2009). Available
at https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol14/iss2/4 (emphasi ing that [p]ort
state control is not, and can never be, a substitute for the proper exercise of flag state
responsibility. Flag states have the primary responsibility of safeguarding against
substandard ships. When flag states fail to meet their commitments, port states must act as
the last safet net in the control s stem. ).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 206.
84 Id. at 209-210.
85 Id. at 212.
86 Id. at 212-213.
87 See Port State Control: Ship Compliance with International Conventions, LLOYD S
REGISTER, https://www.lr.org/en-us/port-state-control/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2022).
88
Özçayir, supra note 81, at 207. See also Millar, supra note 1 (highlighting the
jurisdictional complexities of vessel nationality; when the COVID-19 pandemic hit, many
cruise ships were denied access to ports); Stuart Slade, Could COVID-19 End Flags of
Convenience?, DEFENSE & SECURITY MONITOR (Apr. 9, 2020) ( When the COVID-19
pandemic struck, [cruise ships] received messages from the ports they were about to visit
that they were being denied entry, and advising them to seek assistance from their national
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control provides some measure of enforcement of international regulations, it
essentially forces the port state to assume some flag state duties.89 Port state
control cannot substitute for flag state regulation; ideally port state control
would add transparency in the shipping industry while supplementing the
regulatory efforts of the flag state.
D. Potential Likelihood of Passage
The BBNJ treaty aims to fill the gaps left b the UN s prior attempts
to protect the oceans.90 Specifically, the BBNJ addresses the pressing need to
preserve high seas biodiversity.91 The BBNJ Agreement has been in
development for sixteen years; initially added to the agenda in 2004, the first
session convened in 2017.92 The final session, scheduled for March 2020,
was postponed indefinitely because of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the new
date still undetermined as of July 22, 2021.93 Negotiating the agreement has
been anything but smooth sailing.94 The Agreement, both geographically and
substantively expansive, attempts to balance freedom on the high seas with
protecting the common heritage of mankind. 95 This difficult ideological
balance, additionally complicated by the significance of the subject matter,
has proven controversial in the international arena.96 Negotiations could
continue for some time and man e perienced delegates anticipate a fifth or

flag authorities. Since many flags of convenience are held by small countries with very
limited resources, this advice was not helpful. ).
89 Özçayir, supra note 81.
90 Elizabeth M. DeSanto et al., The Once and Future Treaty: Towards a New Regime for
Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 99 J. MAR. POL. 239, 240 (2018),
available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X18307048
( These gaps were either because provisions and definitions were not specific enough for
states to be certain of the treaty's meaning at the time of UNCLOS, such as the application
of the common heritage of mankind; or did not address problems that have either arisen
since its ratification, such as exploitation of Marine Genetic Resources (MGRs), or
worsened since the treaty's completion in 1982, such as marine pollution. ).
91 Cymie R. Payne, Article, New Law for the High Seas, 36 BERKLEY J. INT L L. 345, 346
(2019).
92 Efthymios Papastavridis, The Negotiations for a New Implementing Agreement Under
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Concerning Marine Biodiversity, 69 INT L &
COMP. L QUARTERLY 585-86 (2020).
93
G.A. Res. 75/L.96 (Jun. 25, 2021).
94 Papastavridis, supra note 92, at 586 ( [R]egardless of when the fourth session takes
place, the omens are not in favour of the BBNJ-canoe reaching its destination an time
soon. ).
95 Draft BBNJ Agreement, supra note 67.
96 Papastavridis, supra note 92, at 586.
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even a si th session in 2021. 97 Even if the BBNJ were to become binding
international law in the future, it is unlikely that the agreement will effect real
change in current ocean governance, as the degree of disagreement between
state parties remains so polarizing.
E. Suggested Changes and Critiques
Even if the draft is finalized and agreed upon, becoming binding
international law, there is currently no provision addressing flags of
convenience.98 For a treaty that intends to fill gaps in ocean governance and
protection, failing to mention one of the primary underlying causes of many
maritime disasters appears to be a crippling shortcoming of the current treaty
iteration. Allowing this regulatory loophole to continue to exist undermines
any attempt at increased regulation, since flags of convenience allow
shipowners to avoid international regulatory compliance. If the BBNJ Treaty
becomes binding international law, the practice of registering ships under
open registries will only increase, as the cost of full compliance increases.
One solution would be to eliminate flags of convenience entirely,
though this option poses issues to small shipowners who may not be able to
afford the tax and compliance costs of registering in their respective home
countries. The elimination of flags of convenience would also face severe
pushback from the extremely powerful shipping industry. The best solution is
to define and enforce the genuine link requirement, thereby decreasing the
ease and accessibility of flags of convenience, while increasing port state
control and transparency of practices within the industry. Ultimately, the
pushback from open registry states and the shipping industry, coupled with
the structures and processes of international law, severely inhibits the
likelihood of passage of a treaty robust enough to ensure real compliance with
international regulations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The UN faces the challenge of drafting a treaty weak enough to be
palatable to enough counties for it to pass, but robust enough to carry out its
goals. The Draft BBNJ Treaty has the potential to make significant strides in
the conservation and protection of our oceans, especially if the final iteration
includes language that addresses flags of convenience and increases
regulation and enforcement of international standards.

97
98

Id.
Draft BBNJ Agreement, supra note 67.

